

Detainee Information

NAME (ISN)	BACKGROUND
Fahed Abdullah Ahmad Ghazi (YM-026)	Ghazi received basic weapons training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp for approximately ten days, stayed at an al-Qa'ida guesthouse and was present in Tora Bora following 9/11. ¹
Abd al Rahim Muhammad Uthman (YM-027)	Uthman left Yemen to participate in jihad in Afghanistan, where he was later selected to be a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden. He fought in Tora Bora, probably against Coalition Forces. He fled to Pakistan after fighting in Tora Bora and was captured in that vicinity along with other bodyguards. In addition, Uthman traveled to Afghanistan along a route commonly used by al-Qa'ida recruits and stayed at al-Qa'ida guesthouses. ²
Moath Hamza Ahmed al-Alwi (YM-028)	Al-Alwi was an al-Qa'ida affiliated fighter who spent time with Usama bin Laden's security detail but probably was not one of bin Laden's bodyguards. He traveled to Afghanistan to participate in jihad by 2000, probably trained with al-Qa'ida and possibly helped manage an al-Qa'ida guesthouse. He also developed relationships with many prominent extremists in Afghanistan and spent time with al-Qa'ida and Taliban fighters on the frontlines, though it is unclear if he engaged directly in combat. ³
Mohammed al-Ansi (YM-029)	Al-Ansi traveled to Afghanistan in 1999 after being recruited by a well-known radical Yemeni religious scholar, Shaykh Muqbil al-Wadi, in Sana'a, Yemen. He joined al-Qa'ida and swore <i>bayat</i> to Usama bin Laden, and served as one of his bodyguards. He likely participated in advanced combat training, may have met with al-Qa'ida's external operations chief (Khalid Shaykh Mohammed) in Karachi and been considered for participation in a suicide attack or deployment to the West. He probably fought alongside other al-Qa'ida members in Afghanistan before being captured by Pakistan authorities after the battle of Tora Bora. ⁴
Ahmed Umar Abdullah Al Hikimi (YM-030)	Hikimi traveled to Afghanistan several times between 1999 and 2001. He reportedly was present at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp and transferred supplies and fighters to the frontlines. He reportedly was associated with the Kandahar Airport group, which had links to Usama bin Laden. ⁵
Mahmud Abd al Aziz Abd al Mujahid (YM-031)	Aziz traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan, almost certainly to participate in jihad, and once served as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden. ⁶
Mohammed al Edah (YM-033)	Al-Edah met with Usama bin Laden on several occasions in Afghanistan and was associated with

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	his bodyguards. In addition, he attended al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp and stayed at an al-Qa'ida guesthouse. ⁷
Abdel Malik Ahmed Abdel Wahab al-Rahabi (YM-037)	Al-Rahabi traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan for jihad and almost certainly was a member of al-Qa'ida. A body of reporting indicates he fought on the front lines, was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden and may have been selected by al-Qa'ida to participate in a hijacking plot. ⁸
Rida Bin Salih al-Yazidi (TS-038)	Al-Yazidi participated in terrorist activities in Bosnia in 1995 while associated with the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (AIG). In 1998, he associated with the Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) and in 1999 traveled on a fake passport to the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan which was managed by a senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant. There, he received extensive weapons and explosives training, and later received additional explosives training. He was sent by the Taliban to front-line fighting positions at Karabel and later Khwaja Ghar, Afghanistan in early 2001. He was sentenced in absentia by a foreign government to 20 years in prison for being a member of a terrorist organization operating abroad. ⁹
Ali Hamza Ahmed Suleiman al Bahlul (YM-039)	Bahlul served as Usama bin Laden's personal assistant and secretary for public relations, produced propaganda videos (including a video celebrating the attack on the USS COLE), and arranged the loyalty oaths for two of the 9/11 hijackers along with their martyr wills. Preceding the 9/11 attacks, he fled to Pakistan with Usama bin Laden and senior al-Qa'ida leaders where he was captured in December 2001. In November 2008, he was convicted by a military commission of material support for terrorism, solicitation of others to commit war crimes, and inchoate conspiracy to commit war crimes. ¹⁰
Abd al-Qadir Husayn Ali al-Muzaffari (YM-040)	Al-Muzaffari traveled to Afghanistan in late 1999 for jihad. He trained and then became an instructor at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp and briefly worked as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden. ¹¹
Majid Mahmud Abdu Ahmed (YM-041)	Ahmed was recruited to fight for the Taliban while attending al-Furqan Institute in Yemen in 1999 and received basic and probably specialized training in Afghanistan from al-Qa'ida. He fought on the frontlines, became a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden in August 2001 and was captured with 30 other al-Qa'ida affiliated individuals following the battle in Tora Bora. ¹²
Samir Naji al-Hasan Muqbil	Muqbil was reported to have received basic training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp. He

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(YM-043)	was a foot soldier in the Sadiq Unit with the Taliban. He was reportedly part of Usama bin Laden's guard force. ¹³
Muhammed Rajab Sadiq Abu Ghanim (YM-044)	Ghanim was an experienced militant who probably acted as a guard for Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan. He forged relationships with future al-Qa'ida members while fighting for jihadist causes during the 1990s and probably participated in plots against government and Western interests in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He also associated with several USS COLE plotters and probably left Yemen for Afghanistan around the time of the bombing in October 2000, although there is no evidence that he had a role in the operation. In Afghanistan, he fought for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, worked for an al-Qa'ida-associated charity, possibly trained to become an al-Qa'ida instructor, and became one of bin Laden's guards. Pakistani authorities arrested him with other suspected bin Laden bodyguards as they crossed into Pakistan in late 2001. ¹⁴
Mohammad Mani Ahmad al-Qahtani (SA-063)	Al-Qahtani (SA-063) attempted to enter the United States on August 4, 2001, after almost certainly having been selected by senior al-Qa'ida members to be the 20th hijacker for the 9/11 attacks. He probably understood that he was intended to be used as part of a suicide operation, but he was probably unaware of the specifics of the attack. He was denied entry to the United States by Immigration and Naturalization Service officers who found the circumstances of his travel and his conduct to be suspicious. Around September 2000, he traveled to Afghanistan and received basic and advanced training from al-Qa'ida. He swore allegiance to Usama bin Laden, who told al-Qahtani he would be assigned a special mission. Bin Laden directed him to meet with al-Qa'ida's operations chief Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) (KU-10024) in mid-2001. KSM trained al-Qahtani on operational communications and told him to return to Saudi Arabia to obtain a new passport and visas for the US and UK. After obtaining his passport and visas, al-Qahtani traveled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and met with al-Qa'ida financial and travel facilitator Mustafa al-Hawsawi, who also facilitated the travel of four 9/11 hijackers into the US. Hawsawi provided al-Qahtani with money and a one-way ticket to Orlando, Florida. Mohamed Atta, the tactical leader and hijacker-pilot of 9/11, was almost certainly waiting at the Orlando International Airport for al-Qahtani's arrival. However, al-Qahtani failed to clear immigration and was deported back to the UAE. He returned to Pakistan and Afghanistan in August 2001,

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	separately informing KSM and bin Laden about his failure to enter the US. He then traveled to Kabul to fight on the frontlines against the Northern Alliance. Following the onset of Coalition bombing in Afghanistan, al-Qahtani fled to the mountains of Tora Bora and briefly rejoined bin Laden and his bodyguards before being captured. ¹⁵
Adham Mohamed Ali Awad (YM-088)	Awad admitted that he traveled to Afghanistan in mid-September 2001 for the purpose of engaging in armed conflict against U.S. and allied forces. In December of 2001, he joined a group of al-Qa'ida fighters who had barricaded themselves inside a hospital. ¹⁶
Abdul al-Mushin Abd al-Rab Salih al-Busi (aka Abdul al Muhsin Reb Salah al Aubaissy) (YM-091)	Al-Busi was a former Yemeni National Police officer who traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 to engage in jihad after hearing a fatwa to do so. He received training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp and fought on the front lines for five months in Khogajar, Afghanistan. ¹⁷
Abdul Rahman Mohammed Saleh Nasir (YM-115)	Nasir received weapons training at a Taliban-run training camp near the front lines in Karabak, Afghanistan, stayed at a guesthouse in Kabul, and then spent approximately nine to ten months on the front lines in Afghanistan. ¹⁸
Mukhtar Yahya Naji al-Warafi (YM-117)	Al-Warafi traveled to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. He received weapons training on the front line and provided medical assistance to wounded and sick Taliban fighters. ¹⁹
Ghaleb Nassar al-Bihani (YM-128)	Al-Bihani traveled to Afghanistan for jihad and almost certainly was a member of al-Qa'ida. He attended al-Qa'ida and Taliban-affiliated training camps in Afghanistan, including al-Farouq, where he received instruction on the use of small arms and probably anti-aircraft weapons, IEDs, mortars, and landmines. Reporting indicates that he operated on the frontlines against the Northern Alliance. His extensive knowledge of al-Qa'ida and Taliban leadership and operational procedures suggests he actively supported both groups, though probably not in a leadership position. ²⁰
Salem Ahmad Hadi Bin Kanad (YM-131)	In the late 1990s or 2000, Kanad traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan to wage jihad against the Northern Alliance. He fought on the frontlines in a Taliban unit commanded by Abu Turab al-Pakistani, and he possibly served a low-level leadership role replacing Abu Turab when he was wounded. He possibly received extremist training from al-Qa'ida. ²¹

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Fayiz Ahmad Yahia Suleiman (SA-153)	Suleiman reportedly trained with the Taliban and trained at the al-Farouq camp. He may have received specialized training in poison making. He served as an imam and met with Usama bin Laden in Tora Bora. He denied having a connection with the Taliban or al-Qa'ida. He was at Tora Bora before being arrested trying to cross the border into Pakistan. ²²
Ali Yahya Mahdi al Raimi (YM-167)	Al Raimi went to Afghanistan to help fight in the war and he received training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp. ²³
Abu Bakr Ibn Muhammad al-Ahdal (YM-171)	Al-Ahdal traveled to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban and served as a fighter for the Taliban Arab forces on the frontlines. ²⁴
Tariq Ali Abdallah Ahmed Ba Odah (YM-178)	Ba Odah went to Afghanistan for jihad. He received training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp and was sent to the frontlines at Bagram before going to Tora Bora. He was identified as having met with Usama bin Laden numerous times. ²⁵
Salem Abdu Salam Ghereby (LY-189)	Ghereby was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. He received training at two training camps in Afghanistan and established a guesthouse with other Libyans in an al-Qa'ida enclave in Afghanistan. He was arrested in the Tora Bora region. ²⁶
Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Awn al-Shamrani (SA-195)	Al Shamrani was recruited for jihad while working as a high school teacher in Saudi Arabia, and he subsequently served as a recruiter in Saudi Arabia for al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. He traveled to Afghanistan, where he trained with and almost certainly joined both al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. After his training, he possibly attempted to travel to Chechnya to engage in jihad but was unable to enter that region and returned to Saudi Arabia. He later returned to Afghanistan, where he fought on the frontlines against the Northern Alliance and almost certainly US Forces. While in Afghanistan, he probably cultivated direct or indirect relationships with numerous extremist leaders. ²⁷
Mahmud Umar Muhammad Bin Atef (YM-202)	Bin Atef received weapons training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp. He was seen at the frontlines in Kvaj Ghr and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan and he fought on the frontlines in Konduz, Afghanistan until his capture in December 2001. ²⁸
Abd Al Rahman Abdu Abu Al Ghayth Sulayman (YM-223)	Sulayman traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in 2001 to join the Taliban. He received weapons training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp, fought on the front lines and spent time in an al-Qa'ida guest house. ²⁹

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Muhammad Salih Husayn al-Shaykh (YM-233)	Al-Shaykh received weapons training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp and was later seen at Tora Bora. He may have received training to be a suicide bomber. ³⁰
Saeed Ahmed Mohammed Abdullah Sarem Jarabh (YM-235)	In mid-2001, Jarabh traveled to Afghanistan, stayed at al-Qa'ida guesthouses, received at least basic weapons training at al-Qa'ida camps, and possibly fought on the frontlines. ³¹
Abdullah Y Yahya (YM-240)	Yahya traveled to Afghanistan using a false passport. He was identified as being in Tora Bora after receiving weapons training at the al-Farouq camp and anti-aircraft/RPG training at Malek Center. ³²
Khalid Ahmed Qasim (YM-242)	Qasim traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in late 1999 for extremist training. He received basic and advanced instruction from al-Qa'ida at the al-Farouq camp before 9/11, possibly taught militants to use weapons, and may have fought for the Taliban before fleeing to the Tora Bora mountains in late 2001. While in Afghanistan, Qasim was closely affiliated with al-Qa'ida, briefly met Usama bin Laden at Tora Bora, and possibly became a member of al-Qa'ida. ³³
Abdul Latif Nasir (MO-244)	Nasir fought for several years with the Taliban on the front lines in Kabul and Bagram, Afghanistan, and again at Tora Bora, as a commander and weapons trainer. He was recruited to fight in Chechnya by a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in 1996 while working at one of Usama bin Laden's charcoal production companies in Sudan. He traveled to Yemen on his way to Chechnya, but was rerouted to Afghanistan in 1997 to receive training in weapons, topography, and explosives at al-Qa'ida camps. He became a weapons trainer at al-Farouq training camp and a member of the al-Qa'ida training subcommittee. He had occasional access to senior al-Qa'ida members, including Usama bin Laden. He led a retreat to Tora Bora in late 2001 and acted in a leadership role there during fighting against US forces. ³⁴
Muhammad Abdullah Muhammed al-Hamiri (YM-249)	Al-Hamiri received training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp and was seen at an al-Qa'ida guesthouse. ³⁵
Muhammad Said Salim Bin Salman (YM-251)	Salman traveled to Afghanistan for jihad and received training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp. He worked on the frontlines, possibly as a cook. ³⁶
Said Muhammad Salih Hatim (YM-255)	Hatim received training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp and stayed at several al-Qa'ida guesthouses in Afghanistan. He claimed he was positioned on the rearlines in Kabul and brought food to Taliban soldiers on the frontlines. ³⁷

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Umar Bin Hamza Abdallahyiv (aka Muhammadi Davlatov) (TI-257)	Davlatov is reported to have attended a poisons class in Afghanistan in 2001. He was captured with handwritten notebooks on creating explosives and poisons and information about communications and leadership in a counterintelligence unit. ³⁸
Mju'ayn al-Din Jamal al-Din Abd al-Sattar (TC-309)	Al-Sattar received training and then served as a trainer at the al-Farouq training camp in Afghanistan. He was reported to be seen with Usama bin Laden at the al-Farouq camp. He participated in hostilities at Tora Bora and provided religious encouragement to other fighters. ³⁹
Ahmad Yaslam Said Kuman (YM-321)	Kuman received basic and advanced training at Taliban and al-Qa'ida camps. He spent five months fighting on the frontlines with Taliban forces in Bagram and Tora Bora. He claimed to have a personal relationship with Usama bin Laden and one of his sons. ⁴⁰
Mashur Abdullah Muqbil Ahmed al-Sabri (YM-324)	Al-Sabri was an al-Qa'ida and Taliban associate who had ties to numerous extremists but probably did not play a significant role in terrorist operations. He associated with an al-Qa'ida operative who later killed himself during the bombing of the USS COLE, although there is no indication al-Sabri had foreknowledge of the attack. He traveled to Afghanistan in late 2000. While in Afghanistan, he stayed at Taliban and al-Qa'ida guesthouses, possibly received militant training, fought alongside the Taliban, and was acquainted with Usama bin Laden. ⁴¹
Mustafa Abd-al-Qawi Abd-al-Aziz al-Shamiri (YM-434)	Al-Shamiri fought in several jihadist theaters and associated with al-Qa'ida members in Afghanistan. He was previously believed to be an al-Qa'ida facilitator or courier, as well as a trainer, but it is now believed these activities were likely carried out by other known extremists with similar names or aliases. Fragmentary reporting links him to fighting in Bosnia in 1995, and he claimed that he fought in Yemen's civil war in 1996 and in Afghanistan for the Taliban from 2000-2001 – including against the Northern Alliance and US forces – before his capture near Mazar-e-Sharif. He probably took explosives training at a camp in Afghanistan, and he may have been co-located at a safehouse in Yemen with operatives who plotted the USS COLE bombing, although there are no other indications that he played a role in that operation. ⁴²
Mohammed Ali Fowza (YM-440)	Fowza received basic training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp and stayed at Taliban and al-Qa'ida guesthouses. He was interested in joining the fight and traveled to Taloqan, Afghanistan where he joined an Afghan Taliban unit engaged in fighting the Northern Alliance. He claimed to have seen bin Laden three times. ⁴³

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Abdul Rahman Ahmed (YM-441)	Ahmed was probably a low-level fighter who was aligned with al-Qa'ida. He traveled to Afghanistan in mid-2001 and trained at an al-Qa'ida training camp. He probably exaggerated his involvement in and knowledge of terrorist activities and likely did not play a senior role in terrorist activities. ⁴⁴
Abd al Rahman Umar al-Qyati (YM-461)	Al-Qyati received training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp in Afghanistan, traveled throughout Afghanistan with his unit and served as a guard at the Kandahar Airport. ⁴⁵
Mohammed Mohammed Ahmen Said (YM-498)	Said received training at an al-Qa'ida camp in Afghanistan. He fought on the frontlines and was injured by an explosion in Tora Bora. ⁴⁶
Khalid Muhammad Salih al-Dhuby (YM-506)	Al-Dhuby received training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp and traveled to Tora Bora after 9/11. ⁴⁷
Salman Yahya Hassan Mahammad Rabei'i (YM-508)	Rabei'i was an al-Qa'ida recruit who trained with the group and possibly fought at Tora Bora. He came into contact with extremists in Yemen through his brother, Fawaz—an al-Qa'ida operative—in 1999, and traveled to Afghanistan in August 2001. He stayed at al-Qa'ida guesthouses, underwent basic extremist training, and possibly attended advanced training. He was present at Usama bin Laden's Tora Bora mountain complex in late 2001 and possibly fought against Coalition forces there before the Northern Alliance captured him in December 2001. ⁴⁸
Mohammed Nasir Yahya Kazaz (YM-509)	Kazaz received basic training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp and was also a light weapons trainer at al-Farouq. He was in charge of a group of fighters in Tora Bora. ⁴⁹
Yassim Qasim Mohammed Ismail Qasim (YM-522)	Qasim traveled to Afghanistan in 1999, underwent extensive combat training, and probably fought alongside al-Qa'ida members. After arriving in Afghanistan—purportedly to train for the Chechen jihad—he stayed in Afghanistan and Pakistan until his capture at Tora Bora in late 2001. He received training at three camps and completed basic and advanced weapons instruction, as well as training on landmines. He stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses, studied at a religious institute affiliated with the group, and probably fought and led teams of al-Qa'ida fighters in Bagram and Tora Bora. He had connections with and access to some senior members but did not play an organizational role in the group. ⁵⁰
Tariq Mahmoud Ahmed al-Sawah (EG-535)	Al-Sawah was an al-Qa'ida explosives expert who probably designed the devices al-Qa'ida used to attack certain U.S. targets. During the 1990s, he worked for non-governmental organizations

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	linked to terrorism and then joined the Bosnian Army where he received weapons and explosives training. He traveled to Afghanistan sometime in 2000 to join al-Qa'ida and the Taliban and to attend training camps affiliated with al-Qa'ida. While in Afghanistan, he became an explosives instructor for al-Qa'ida and fought against the Northern Alliance and US Forces. He met numerous senior terrorist leaders, but there are no indications he held a leadership position. ⁵¹
Umar Said Salim al-Dini (YM-549)	Al-Dini traveled to Afghanistan in August 2001 but became ill before undergoing training. He was directed to travel to Tora Bora with other Arabs staying in a safehouse. He was given a weapon and remained there for a month before being injured in an explosion. ⁵²
Walid Said Bin Said Zaid (YM-550)	Zaid received basic training at the al-Qa'ida Al-Farouq training camp until it was closed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. ⁵³
Faez Mohammed Ahmed al-Kandari (KU-552)	Al-Kandari traveled to Afghanistan in 1997, returned to the Middle East in 1998, and served as a recruiter and propagandist for al-Qa'ida. He returned in 2001 to Afghanistan, where he almost certainly received extremist training from al-Qa'ida, provided support to an al-Qa'ida-affiliated charity, and probably fought on the frontlines against Coalition forces. He likely served as Usama bin Laden's spiritual advisor and confidant and possibly developed close ties with other al-Qa'ida leaders. ⁵⁴
Hajawali Mohmad (AF-560)	Mohmad was a moneychanger affiliated with Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. He served as Usama bin Laden's financier and managed large sums of money for the Taliban during the 1990s and early 2000s. He facilitated money transfers to purchase weapons for al-Qa'ida and established and maintained close associations and relationships with senior leadership in the Taliban (including Usama bin Laden), al-Qa'ida, and other organizations supporting terrorism including the HIG. Mohammed furnished financial services support to the operations of the Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and other organizations. ⁵⁵
Mansour Muhammed Ali al-Qatta (SA-566)	Al-Qatta traveled to Afghanistan and stayed at an al-Qa'ida guesthouse before receiving explosives training. He spent 5 weeks at a fighting position near Loghar, Afghanistan. ⁵⁶
Suhayl Abdul Anam al-Sharabi (YM-569)	Al-Sharabi trained as a militant in Afghanistan before 9/11. He met senior al-Qa'ida members at the camps and became a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden. He was part of al-Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's (KU-10024) plot to conduct 9/11-style attacks in

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	Southeast Asia and traveled to Malaysia, where he stayed with al-Qa'ida operative Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash (YM-10014) and two of the 9/11 hijackers. ⁵⁷
Zahar Omar Hamis bin Hamdoun (YM-576)	Hamdoun traveled to Afghanistan in 1999 and trained at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp before acting as a weapons and explosives trainer. He probably fought under the command of an al-Qa'ida leader during Operation Enduring Freedom and possibly commanded foreign fighters. He fled to Pakistan after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom and was captured by Pakistani officials at a safehouse in Karachi along with several al-Qa'ida members. Phone numbers found among Hamdoun's documents have been linked to senior al-Qa'ida associated extremists. ⁵⁸
Abd Al Aziz Abduh Abdallah Ali al-Suwaydi (YM-578)	Al-Suwaydi trained at al-Qa'ida's al Farouq training camp and served as an explosives trainer at the Tarnak Farms training camp in Afghanistan. ⁵⁹
Abdullah Al Sharbi (SA-682)	Al Sharbi received weapons training in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s and at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp in 2001. He was selected by senior al-Qa'ida leadership to receive training in Faisalabad, Pakistan which would allow him to train others to manufacture and use electronic bomb detonators for use against American soldiers. ⁶⁰
Said bin Brahim bin Umran Bakush (AG-685)	Bakush was a trusted associate of prominent al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Zubaydah (GZ-10016) and al-Qa'ida trainer Abu Faraj al-Libi (LY-10017). In the late 1990s, Bakush likely traveled to Afghanistan, where he attended basic and advanced training and later served as an instructor at an extremist camp. He was captured at a safe house with Zubaydah in March 2002, where safehouse members were suspected of training for future attacks, including against US interests. ⁶¹
Fahmi Abdallah Ahmad Ubadi al Tulaqi (YM-688)	Al-Tulaqi trained at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp and then spent two years on the frontlines fighting the Northern Alliance. ⁶²
Sufyian Barhoumi (AG-694)	Barhoumi was radicalized and recruited in the late-1999's at the Baker Street Mosque in London. He obtained a falsified passport in the United Kingdom and traveled to Afghanistan in 1999, intending to fight in Chechnya but ultimately deciding to stay in Afghanistan. He received advanced training at several camps in Afghanistan, including at Khalden and Derunta. While he probably was not a member of al-Qa'ida or the Taliban, he worked with multiple violent extremist groups as part of the Khalden group, was well known by several leaders in al-Qaida, and traveled to several training camps and guest houses throughout Afghanistan between 2000

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	and 2001 to provide training in remote control improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs). Following the onset of Coalition operations, he most likely traveled to Tora Bora with members of al-Qa'ida, eventually fleeing to Pakistan and staying at several safehouses while evading Pakistan authorities before finally agreeing to provide training on how to construct RCIEDs at well-known al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Zubaydah (GZ-10016) at his safehouse in Faisalabad. While there, he probably agreed to join Zubaydah's Martyr's Brigade and plot further attacks against the United States. He was arrested during a raid by Pakistani Police, along with Zubaydah and several al-Qa'ida members at a Faisalabad safehouse on March 28, 2002. ⁶³
Omar Khalif Mohammed Abu Baker Mahjour Umar (LY-695)	Umar was a senior member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) who associated closely with al-Qa'ida before his detention. In the mid-1990s, he traveled to Sudan, where he worked for a company owned by Usama bin Laden. He later relocated—probably with bin Laden in 1995—to Afghanistan, where he probably trained other extremists and fought against the Northern Alliance and US forces. He underwent extremist training in Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan before emerging as a trainer in military skills, including explosives use, at LIFG and al-Qa'ida camps. He worked closely with al-Qa'ida, and he developed relationships with the group's senior leaders while he was in Sudan and Afghanistan, but there is limited information suggesting he formally joined the group. Pakistani security forces detained him in March 2002 at a safehouse run by senior al-Qa'ida figure Abu Zubaydah. ⁶⁴
Jabran al-Qahtani (SA-696)	Al-Qahtani is a self-radicalized electrical engineer who traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan in October 2001 to fight against US forces in Afghanistan. He received abbreviated weapons training at an al-Qa'ida camp in Afghanistan and was selected by a senior al-Qa'ida military commander to receive explosives detonator training in Faisalabad, Pakistan. There, he learned to construct circuit boards for radio-remote controlled improvised explosive devices with the intention of teaching bomb making techniques to operatives attacking US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. He was captured by Pakistani authorities on 28 March 2002 at senior al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Zubaydah's (GZ-10016) safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan, five months after leaving Saudi Arabia. ⁶⁵
Ravil Mingazov (RS-702)	Mingazov traveled to Afghanistan in late 2000 or early 2001 and trained at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp and Kara Karga, an explosives and poisons training camp. He was a member of the Islamic

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	Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) prior to going to Afghanistan. ⁶⁶
Ismail Ali Faraj Ali Bakush (LY-708)	Bakush was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and served on their military committee. He received specialized weapons and electronics training at al-Qa'ida's al Farouq training camp and other training camps and provided military training at camps in Afghanistan. He was considered an expert with explosives and helped train al-Qa'ida fighters and others in Afghanistan. ⁶⁷
Jamil Said (YM-728)	Said attended a 30-day military training camp where he learned to march and dismantle and re-assemble Kalashnikov rifles. In Kandahar, he stayed at the house of an al-Qa'ida facilitator who ran a guesthouse and had sworn <i>bayat</i> to Usama bin Laden for over a month. He rented a house in Kandahar next to the residence of Taliban leader Mullah 'Umar. ⁶⁸
Abdul Zahir (AF-753)	Zahir was an Afghan insurgent captured by U.S. military forces in July 2002 during a raid targeting an individual named Abdul Bari—an alias used by Zahir—who was believed to be involved in the production and distribution of chemical or biological weapons for al-Qa'ida. Because of Abdul Bari's efforts to coordinate a shipment of unspecified items on behalf of the Taliban, U.S. military forces targeted a compound in Afghanistan and captured Zahir and recovered suspicious substances initially believed to be chemical or biological agents (but later determined to be benign substances). While Zahir admitted to using the alias Abdul Bari on the phone—a fairly common name in the country—he ultimately provided no actionable information relative to al-Qa'ida's weapons network, and was probably misidentified as the individual who had ties to al-Qa'ida weapons facilitation activities. He probably worked as a bookkeeper and translator from mid-to-late 1995 until late 2001 for al-Qa'ida military commander Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (IZ-10026) and for an Afghan Taliban commander also named Abdul Hadi. He also probably served for a few months in 2002 as a low-level member of a Taliban cell. He may have been recruited to translate in several al-Iraqi-owned guesthouses in Kabul where he probably had limited access to senior leaders from al-Qa'ida and other extremist groups. While Zahir has admitted to working for al-Iraqi and the Taliban, he says that he was coerced to do so under threats to his family's safety and he has denied any direct involvement with the Taliban outside of his role as a translator. ⁶⁹
Mohamedou Ould Slahi (MR-	Slahi traveled from Germany to Afghanistan in 1991 and again in 1992 to join the mujahidin in

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760)	their fight against the Afghan communist regime. There, he trained at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp, swore <i>bayat</i> to al-Qa'ida, and prepared to fight at the Battle of Gardez. Between trips, he recruited for the Afghan jihad. For the next nine years, he lived mostly in Germany, spending time in Canada and Mauritania, and recruited primarily for the Bosnian and Chechen jihads. He facilitated the travel of future 9/11 operational coordinator Ramzi bin al-Shibh (YM-10013) and two future 9/11 hijackers to Chechnya via Afghanistan in 1999. He was arrested in Senegal in January 2000 and moved to Mauritania, where he was arrested again in November 2001. ⁷⁰
Obaidullah (AF-762)	Obaidullah received training in explosives from the Taliban and was part of an al-Qa'ida-associated improvised explosive device (IED) cell that targeted Coalition forces in Khowst, Afghanistan. During the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom, he also may have provided logistics support to fighters aligned with al-Qa'ida. His IED cell probably was led by Bostan Karim (AF-975) and under the ultimate control of al-Qa'ida senior paramilitary commander Abu Layth al-Libi. Obaidullah admitted to working with Karim to acquire and plant anti-tank mines to target US and other Coalition Forces. In July 2002, he was captured by US Special Forces during a raid of his compound in Khowst, Afghanistan, where 23 antitank landmines as well as a notebook containing electronic and detonator schematics involving explosives and mines were recovered. ⁷¹
Ahmed Mohammed Ahmed Haza al-Darbi (SA-768)	Al-Darbi pleaded guilty before a military commission to being an al-Qa'ida member who between 1996 and 2000 received training at multiple al-Qa'ida camps including al Farouq where he eventually became a weapons instructor. He met privately with Usama bin Laden. Between 2000 and 2002 he worked directly for Abd Al-Rahim Husayn Muhammad Abd Al-Nashiri in an al-Qa'ida plot to use small ships loaded with explosives to attack oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz and/or off the Yemeni coast in the Gulf of Aden. ⁷²
Ayub Murshid Ali Salih (YM-836)	Salih was a low-ranking Yemeni militant who we assess trained in Afghanistan before 9/11 and subsequently met senior al-Qa'ida figures in Pakistan. He traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in mid-2000, where he probably was trained in military tactics at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp. He is one of the Yemenis arrested during the September 11, 2002 raid on an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan. These Yemenis were labelled the "Karachi Six" based on concerns that they were part of an al-Qa'ida operational cell intended to support a future attack, but it was later

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	determined that the label more accurately reflected the common circumstances of their arrest and the six Yemenis were likely elements of a large pool of Yemeni fighters that senior al-Qa'ida planners considered potentially available to support future operations. Salih probably did not play a major role in terrorist operations. ⁷³
Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah (YM-837)	Al-Marwalah was a low-level Yemeni militant who traveled to Afghanistan in the fall of 2000 to support the jihadist cause in Chechnya and train to fight with Muslims against the Russians. He received instruction at an al-Qa'ida camp, returned to Sanaa, Yemen in December 2000, and then travelled again to Afghanistan in fall 2001 and received additional militant training. After 9/ 11, he briefly went to the front lines against the Northern Alliance near Bagram, Afghanistan, although he claimed he never saw action. He subsequently moved through a series of safehouses in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He is one of the Yemenis arrested during the September 11, 2002 raid on an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan. These Yemenis were labelled the "Karachi Six" based on concerns that they were part of an al-Qa'ida operational cell intended to support a future attack, but it was later determined that the label more accurately reflected the common circumstances of their arrest and the six Yemenis were likely elements of a large pool of Yemeni fighters that senior al-Qa'ida planners considered potentially available to support future operations. Although his role in al-Qa'ida operational plotting is unverified, his last will and testament found in the Karachi raids included a martyrdom statement. ⁷⁴
Shawqi Awad Bazuhair (YM-838)	Bazuhair was a low-level Yemeni militant who traveled to Afghanistan in mid-2001, received basic training at an al-Qa'ida camp, and served on the frontlines before 9/ 11. Following the onset of Coalition operations, he fled to Pakistan where he met senior al-Qa'ida figures who were arranging his return to Yemen. He is one of the Yemenis arrested during the September 11, 2002 raid on an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan. These Yemenis were labelled the "Karachi Six" based on concerns that they were part of an al-Qa'ida operational cell intended to support a future attack, but it was later determined that the label more accurately reflected the common circumstances of their arrest and the six Yemenis were likely elements of a large pool of Yemeni fighters that senior al-Qa'ida planners considered potentially available to support future operations. ⁷⁵
Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani	Al-Mudwani was recruited and traveled to Afghanistan for jihad in July 2001 and after a short

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(YM-839)	stay at a guesthouse in Kandahar, attended the al Farouq training camp where he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, RPG's and the PK machine gun. Al-Mudwani attended a speech given by Usama bin Laden during his training at al Farouq, and last saw bin Laden in Khowst, Afghanistan about a month before the fall of Kabul to Coalition forces. After al Farouq closed due to U.S. bombings post-September 11, 2001, the detainee fled Afghanistan. He is one of the Yemenis arrested during the September 11, 2002 raid on an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan. These Yemenis were labelled the "Karachi Six" based on concerns that they were part of an al-Qa'ida operational cell intended to support a future attack, but it was later determined that the label more accurately reflected the common circumstances of their arrest and the six Yemenis were likely elements of a large pool of Yemeni fighters that senior al-Qa'ida planners considered potentially available to support future operations. ⁷⁶
Hail Aziz Ahmed al-Maythali (YM-840)	Al-Maythali traveled to Afghanistan for jihad and received military training at several al-Qa'ida affiliated training camps, including al Farouq where he received weapons, tactical, and reconnaissance training. He traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan in early 2001 and was encouraged to join the fight with the Taliban while residing at the Ashara guesthouse, a location known as a way-point for people going back and forth from the front lines. He spent approximately two months at the front lines of the fighting, and some time as a guard at the Kandahar airport compound. He fled Afghanistan in November 2001. He is one of the Yemenis arrested during the September 11, 2002 raid on an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan. These Yemenis were labelled the "Karachi Six" based on concerns that they were part of an al-Qa'ida operational cell intended to support a future attack, but it was later determined that the label more accurately reflected the common circumstances of their arrest and the six Yemenis were likely elements of a large pool of Yemeni fighters that senior al-Qa'ida planners considered potentially available to support future operations. ⁷⁷
Said Salih Said Nashir (YM-841)	Nashir traveled to fight in Afghanistan in June 2001, trained at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp, and admitted to a close association with some of the group's external operations planners and senior leadership, including senior al-Qa'ida operative and 9/11 conspirator Walid bin Attash (YM-10014). He is one of the Yemenis arrested during the September 11, 2002 raid on an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan. These Yemenis were labelled the "Karachi Six" based on

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	concerns that they were part of an al-Qa'ida operational cell intended to support a future attack, but it was later determined that the label more accurately reflected the common circumstances of their arrest and the six Yemenis were likely elements of a large pool of Yemeni fighters that senior al-Qa'ida planners considered potentially available to support future operations. ⁷⁸
Tawfiq Nasir Awadh al-Bayhani (SA-893)	Al-Bayhani was an al-Qa'ida member. He stayed at an al-Qa'ida affiliated guesthouse and received training at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq training camp and training with improvised explosive devices near Kandahar, Afghanistan. ⁷⁹
Karim Bostam (AF-975)	Bostam was probably the leader of an al-Qa'ida-associated improvised explosive device (IED) cell that targeted Coalition Forces in Khowst, Afghanistan. In this role, he probably planned, directed, or conducted multiple attacks against Coalition Forces. He also was probably an al-Qa'ida member who took orders from al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan, particularly senior paramilitary commander Abu Layth al-Libi. Some reporting indicates that he facilitated al-Qa'ida members' and foreign fighters' escape from Afghanistan into Pakistan following the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom. Since his initial capture, he consistently has denied affiliation with any terrorist or extremist group or involvement in any terrorist or extremist activities. ⁸⁰
Omar Mohammad Ali al-Rammah (YM-1017)	Al-Rammah received weapons training at al Khair camp in Afghanistan, basic training at al-Qa'ida's al Farouq training camp, and rudimentary military training in the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia. He was fighting in Chechnya prior to September 11, 2001. He was a member of a paratrooper suicide unit known as the Kamikaze Unit. Al-Rammah was captured with two explosive detonators in his possession. ⁸¹
Mohammad Kamin (Muhammad Unis) (AF-1045)	Kamin was aligned with several extremist groups, including al-Qa'ida, and helped facilitate their operations against US Forces in eastern Afghanistan before Afghan authorities captured him in May 2003. He probably worked for the Taliban before Operation Enduring Freedom and was recruited for jihad in early 2002 by Jaish-e Mohammed (JEM), an al-Qa'ida affiliate. Kamin trained with al-Qa'ida in early 2003 and probably received specialized instruction on explosives. He subsequently led a cell that procured, delivered, and stored weapons for al-Qa'ida and the Taliban, and also cased targets—probably including US military facilities—along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. ⁸²
Saifullah Paracha (PK-1094)	Paracha was a Pakistan-based businessman and facilitator on behalf of al-Qa'ida senior leaders

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	and operational planners. He met Usama Bin Laden in the early 2000s and later worked with external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KU-10024) to facilitate financial transactions and to develop media. In 2003, Paracha and his US-based oldest son, Uzair, tried to help an al-Qa'ida operative travel to the US—an effort for which Uzair was convicted in November 2005 and is now serving a 30-year sentence in the US. Prior to his detention, Paracha also conducted research on CBRN materials, probably on his own initiative, and offered operational suggestions to al-Qa'ida, including advice on how to smuggle explosives into the US that al-Qa'ida planners probably did not take seriously. ⁸³
Ahmid al-Razak (Haji Hamidullah) (AF-1119)	Hamidullah was an Afghan militant who probably ordered and conducted attacks against Afghan and Coalition personnel during Operation Enduring Freedom. He fought for Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) during the Soviet War in Afghanistan, retained ties to the group thereafter, and probably collaborated with the Taliban and possibly with al-Qa'ida. During Operation Enduring Freedom, he most likely led a group of militants with ties to both HIG and the Taliban planning an attack against an Afghan Government unit. ⁸⁴
Sanad Ali Yislam al-Kazimi (YM-1453)	Al-Kazimi was a member of al-Qa'ida who served about nine months as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan. He received basic training from al-Qa'ida and associated with some of its senior figures. He left Afghanistan in late 2001 following the onset of Coalition operations there. In mid-2002, he traveled to the United Arab Emirates, where he joined an al-Qa'ida cell led by senior operational planner Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. He was tasked to smuggle explosives into the UAE to use in an attack against US or British ships docked there. There is no information suggesting he delivered the explosives, but he provided other forms of logistical support before Nashiri abandoned the plot. He has denied that he intended to support the plot, claiming his only interest was in receiving money from Nashiri. He also probably served as a financial facilitator for the Yemen-based al-Qa'ida branch. He probably was aware that the money he facilitated would be used to support terrorist attacks but may not have had prior knowledge about the specifics of the attacks. ⁸⁵
Hassan Mohammed Salih bin Attash (SA-1456)	Bin Attash received advanced training and attended al-Qa'ida and Taliban training camps. He worked closely with senior al-Qa'ida operatives and his family had a close relationship with Usama bin Laden. He resided in an al-Qa'ida safe house in Afghanistan. He reportedly was

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	involved in moving money as part of an effort to launch attacks against U.S. vessels in the Straits of Hormuz. ⁸⁶
Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-Hajj (YM-1457)	Al-Hajj was a career jihadist who acted as a prominent financial and travel facilitator for al-Qa'ida members before and after the 9/11 attacks. He probably provided logistic or financial support for al-Qa'ida operations, although he may not have had foreknowledge of the plots. He developed ties to senior al-Qa'ida leaders, such as Usama bin Laden and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, and associated with al-Qa'ida plotters and operatives, including members of the USS COLE bombing and some of the 9/11 hijackers. He repeatedly has denied being an al-Qa'ida member, claiming instead that the group trusted him because of his facilitation support. ⁸⁷
Abdul Rabbani Abd Al Rahim Abu Rahman (SA-1460)	Rahman was brought to Afghanistan from Karachi by his brother and sent to the Khalden camp for military training. He cooked at safe houses and began transporting individuals to al-Qa'ida training camps in Afghanistan. He was a manager for several guest houses for mujahedin in Karachi, and was a facilitator assisting with travel and housing arrangements. He was well known to all the mujahedin, including al-Qa'ida. Senior al-Qa'ida members stayed at various guesthouses he ran. He briefly harbored some 9/11 hijackers at a home in Karachi. ⁸⁸
Mohammed Ahmad Rabbani (SA-1461)	In the late 1990's Rabbani traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training, including instruction in weapons, explosives, and tactics. In 2000-2001, his activities included involvement with a safe house and increased work as an al-Qa'ida facilitator. In July 2001, he helped Usama bin Laden and his family move to Tora Bora. After 9/11, the guest house he operated in Pakistan for sick and injured mujahedin was also used to house mujahedin fleeing U.S. forces. He was captured in Karachi on September 9, 2002. ⁸⁹
Abd al-Salam Ali al-Hilah (DP-1463)	Al-Hilah entered into extremist circles at a young age and rose to be a prominent extremist facilitator who leveraged his position within the Yemeni Political Security Organization (PSO) to provide refuge and logistical support to extremist groups. Al-Hilah probably learned about terrorist plots against Yemeni and Western interests on multiple occasions through his extremist contacts. During detention, al-Hilah admitted to many of these activities. His reported pre-detention activities suggest that al-Hilah was sympathetic to extremists and driven by a desire for personal position and financial gain. ⁹⁰
Haroon al-Afghani (AF-3148)	Al-Afghani was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander who organized and led attacks on

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	Coalition forces in Afghanistan and for a time served as a link between senior al-Qa'ida members and other anti-Coalition fighters. He worked as a courier for al-Qa'ida military commander Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (IZ-10026) until 2004 or 2005, provided logistics support to fighters aligned with al-Qa'ida and HIG, and probably collaborated on operational matters with leaders of other anti-coalition groups. ⁹¹
Mustafa Ahmad al Hawsawi (SA-10011)	Al Hawsawi worked for al-Qa'ida's media committee and became a key facilitator for 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KU-10024). He facilitated the travel of some of the 9/11 hijackers to the United States and also facilitated funding for the operation. He is one of five accused facing charges before a military commission for the 9/11 attacks. ⁹²
Ramzi Bin al-Shibh (YM-10013)	Between 1999 and 2001, Bin al-Shibh was a key facilitator and coordinator for the attacks on 11 September 2001, working directly for Usama bin Laden and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) (KU-10024). In late 2001, he fled Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban and began working with KSM in Karachi on follow-on plots against the West, until his capture in 2002. ⁹³ He is one of five accused facing charges before a military commission for the 9/11 attacks.
Walid Bin Attash (YM-10014)	Bin Attash was a key al-Qa'ida operative from 1998 until his capture in 2003. Arriving in Afghanistan in 1995 and receiving training at several camps, Bin Attash subsequently served as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden, as bin Laden's intermediary for Abd al-Rahim Al-Nashiri (SA-10015), and ultimately as a senior operative in planning the attacks on September 11, 2001. After the attacks, Bin Attash helped prepare AQ's defenses around Tora Bora, then fled Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban in late 2001. ⁹⁴ He is one of five accused facing charges before a military commission for the 9/11 attacks.
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (SA-10015)	Al-Nashiri was al-Qa'ida's operations chief in the Arabian Peninsula until his capture in 2002. Trained in explosives, al-Nashiri honed his expertise in suicide attacks and maritime operations. He led cells in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen, and was the mastermind and local manager of the bombing in October 2000 of the USS COLE. The success of the USS COLE operation appeared to have propelled al-Nashiri into a role of greater responsibility. ⁹⁵ He is currently facing charges before a military commission.
Zayn al-Abidin Abu Zubaydah (GZ-10016)	Abu Zubaydah was a leading extremist facilitator who operated in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region from the mid-1990s until his capture. Usama bin Laden recruited him to be one of al-

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	Qa'ida's senior travel facilitators following Zubaydah's success in 1996 at securing safe passage of al-Qa'ida members returning from Sudan to Afghanistan. In November 2001, he assisted Arab fighters in escaping from Afghanistan. ⁹⁶
Abu Faraj al-Libi (LY-10017)	Al-Libi was a veteran paramilitary commander and facilitator in the Pakistan-Afghanistan theater who took on more direct operational responsibilities following the 2003 arrest of former al-Qa'ida external operations chief and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KU-10024). Beginning in mid-2003 al-Libi was the organization's general manager subordinate only to Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, while being heavily involved in financing operatives and their families. ⁹⁷
Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali (aka Ammar al-Baluchi) (PK-10018)	Al-Baluchi served as a key lieutenant for his uncle, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) (KU-10024), in the 9/11 attacks. After the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001, he assisted KSM in organizing the movement of al-Qa'ida operatives and their families to safehouses in Pakistan, and assisted KSM in planning for a variety of terrorist plots against the U.S. and the U.K., until his capture in Karachi, Pakistan in 2003. ⁹⁸ He is one of five accused facing charges before a military commission for the 9/11 attacks.
Riduan bin Isomuddin (aka Hambali) (ID-10019)	Hambali was an operational mastermind in the Southeast Asia-based Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and also served as the primary interface between JI and al-Qa'ida from 2000 until his capture in 2003. He helped plan the first Bali bombings in 2002, which killed more than 200 persons, and facilitated al-Qa'ida financing for the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing the following year. In late 2002, he directed his subordinates Lillie (MY-10022) and Zubair (MY-10021) to case the British High Commission in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and facilitated their work for Al-Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KU-10024), to whom Hambali had longstanding ties. ⁹⁹
Majid Khan (PK-10020)	Before his 2003 capture, Pakistani national Khan was an al-Qa'ida operative with direct connections to the United States. In Pakistan, Khan's uncle and cousin, who were al-Qa'ida operatives, introduced Khan to senior al-Qa'ida operational planner Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KU-10024), who selected Khan as an operative for a possible attack inside the United States. In 2002, Khan also delivered money intended to support terrorist attacks against Western targets to Zubair (MY-10021), an operative who worked directly for Hambali, leader of the Southeast Asia-

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NAME (ISN)	BACKGROUND
	based Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and al-Qa'ida's South Asia representative. ¹⁰⁰
Mohd Farik bin Amin (aka "Zubair") (MY-10021)	Zubair served directly under Hambali (ID-10019), operational planner for the Southeast Asia-based Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI). As one of Hambali's trusted associates, Zubair assisted in Hambali's operations, which included casing targets for JI-planned attacks, until his capture in 2003. Hambali in November 2001 tapped Zubair to be a suicide operative for an al-Qa'ida attack targeting Los Angeles. Zubair played an active role in transferring funds used to finance terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia from al-Qa'ida operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KU-10024) to Hambali. ¹⁰¹
Mohammed Nazir bin Lep (aka Lillie) (MY-10022)	Lillie was a key lieutenant to Hambali (IS-10019), operational planner for the Southeast Asia-based Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI). He facilitated the transfer of al-Qa'ida funds used for the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing in 2003. He was involved in 2002 in the plot against the British High Commission in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and in mid-2002 cased targets in Bangkok and Pattaya, Thailand, at Hambali's direction. He was slated to be a suicide operative for an al-Qa'ida "second wave" attack targeting Los Angeles. Lillie spent time in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2000, where he trained at al-Qa'ida's al-Farouq camp in weaponry and explosives. ¹⁰²
Gouled Hassan Dourad (SO-10023)	Dourad trained in weapons and explosives at the Khaldan camp in Afghanistan and in assassination techniques at another camp in Khowst. He served as the head of a network of al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) members that supported al-Qa'ida in Somalia. He was a member of a small AIAI group that worked for East African al-Qa'ida leader Abu Talha al-Sudani, and his responsibilities included locating safehouses, financial transfers, and weapons procurement. In 2003, he reportedly cased the U.S. military base in Djibouti as part of an Abu Talha suicide truck bombing plot and purchased and delivered weapons to Abu Talha. ¹⁰³
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KU-10024)	Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) is viewed as the driving force behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks as well as several subsequent plots against U.S. and Western targets worldwide. He is one of the five 9/11 co-conspirators charged in military commission proceedings with murder, terrorism, hijacking, attacking civilians and civilian objects, destruction of property, and conspiracy. ¹⁰⁴
Mohammed Abdul Malik Bajabu (KE-10025)	Bajabu was inspired by a radical imam to leave Kenya in 1996 to receive extremist training in Somalia where he developed a close relationship with members of al-Qa'ida in East Africa

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NAME (ISN)	BACKGROUND
	(AQEA), to include high-level operational planners. Bajabu became an AQEA facilitator and was closely involved in the preparation and execution of the November 2002 attacks in Mombasa, Kenya. In February 2007, Kenyan authorities arrested Bajabu for his involvement in the Mombasa attacks and transferred him to US custody a few weeks later. ¹⁰⁵
Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (IZ-10026)	Al-Iraqi associated with leaders of extremist groups allied with al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the Taliban. He worked directly with the Taliban to determine responsibility and lines of communication between Taliban and al-Qaida leaders in Afghanistan, specifically with regard to the targeting of U.S. Forces. He is currently facing charges before a military commission. ¹⁰⁶
Muhammad Rahim (AF-10029)	Rahim was a high-level member of al-Qa'ida and a close associate of Usama bin Laden who who had ties to al-Qa'ida organizations throughout the Middle East. He became one of bin Laden's most trustee facilitators and procurement specialists prior to his detention.. ¹⁰⁷

¹ Administrative Review Board (ARB) 3 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates1-100.pdf (pages 17-21)

² Periodic Review Board (PRB) Unclassified Detainee Profile (Mar. 7, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN027/20160307_U_ISN_027_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN027/160526_U_ISN027_FINAL_DETERMINATION.pdf; *Uthman v. Obama*, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011), available at [https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/727BF5F867C51399852578620051FD30/\\$file/10-5235-1300403.pdf](https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/727BF5F867C51399852578620051FD30/$file/10-5235-1300403.pdf)

³ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (July 7, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN028/20150707_U_ISN028_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN028/151026_U_ISN28_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf; *Al-Alwi v. Obama*, 653 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), available at [https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/007C372BEA1A6DEA852578D5004FBBAE/\\$file/09-5125-1320097.pdf](https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/007C372BEA1A6DEA852578D5004FBBAE/$file/09-5125-1320097.pdf)

⁴ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Oct. 14, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN029/151014_U_ISN029_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN029/160323_U_ISN029_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf

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⁵ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_1.pdf (pages 91-94)

⁶ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Aug 20, 2013), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN031/130820_U_ISN031_GOVERNMENT'S_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN031/131120_U_ISN31_Unclassified%20Summary%20of%20Final%20Determination.pdf

⁷ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (Jul. 31, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_1.pdf (pages 134-137); *see also* *al-Adahi v. Obama*, 613 F.3d 1102, 1106-10 (D.C. Cir 2010), available at [https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/CC9963FC962DF552852578070070BC96/\\$file/09-5333-1254718.pdf](https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/CC9963FC962DF552852578070070BC96/$file/09-5333-1254718.pdf)

⁸ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Oct. 29, 2013), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN037/131029_U_ISN037_GOVERNMENT'S_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN037/141205_U_ISN37_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf

⁹ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (Aug. 20, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates1-100.pdf (pages 52-53)

¹⁰ *United States v. Bahlul*, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.M.C.R. 2011), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/AliHamza09-001/al%20Bahlul%20USCMCR%20Decision%20\(Sept.%209,%202011\).pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/AliHamza09-001/al%20Bahlul%20USCMCR%20Decision%20(Sept.%209,%202011).pdf). The conviction was later vacated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. *Bahlul v. United States*, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), available at [https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/126B06150518461B85257ECB00656CC6/\\$file/11-1324-1575020.pdf](https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/126B06150518461B85257ECB00656CC6/$file/11-1324-1575020.pdf). The Court heard argument in December 2015 on the United States' petition for rehearing.

¹¹ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_1.pdf (pages 166-68)

¹² PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Nov. 13, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN041/20151113_U_ISN041_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf ; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN041/160218_U_ISN041_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf

¹³ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (June 25, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_1.pdf (pages 188-192)

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¹⁴ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Jan. 12, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN044/20160112_U_ISN_044_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf

¹⁵ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Mar. 9, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN063/20160309_U_ISN063_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf

¹⁶ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates1-100.pdf (pages 74-76); see also *Awad v. Obama*, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), available at [https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/71649A2B441BB022852578070070344B/\\$file/09-5351-1248614.pdf](https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/71649A2B441BB022852578070070344B/$file/09-5351-1248614.pdf)

¹⁷ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates1-100.pdf (pages 80-82)

¹⁸ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Dec. 2, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_2.pdf (pages 7-9)

¹⁹ *Al Warafi v. Obama*, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2010), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2009cv2368-16), affirmed in part and remanded in part by *Al Warafi v. Obama*, 2011 U.S. Fed. Appx. 360 (D.C. Cir. 2011), affirmed following remand, 716 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2013), available at [https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/7D20723558D7132685257B75004E3CBE/\\$file/11-5276-1437798.pdf](https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/7D20723558D7132685257B75004E3CBE/$file/11-5276-1437798.pdf); see also ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates101-200.pdf (pages 133-35)

²⁰ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Jan. 27, 2014), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN128/140127_U_ISN128_GOVERNMENT'S_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; see also http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN128/140515_U_ISN128_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf; *al Bihani v. Obama*, 594 F.Supp. 2d. 35 (D.D.C. 2009), affirmed, 590 F.3d. 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), available at [https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/C89FD9E7E1A62C59852578070059E29B/\\$file/09-5051-1223587.pdf](https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/C89FD9E7E1A62C59852578070059E29B/$file/09-5051-1223587.pdf)

²¹ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Jan 23, 2014), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN131/140129_U_ISN131_GOVERNMENT'S_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; see also http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN131/131FullReview/160505_U_ISN131_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf

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- ²² ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_2.pdf (pages 39-41)
- ²³ ARB 1 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (undated), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/ARB_Round_1_Factors_000944-001045.pdf (pages 1031-32)
- ²⁴ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_2.pdf (pages 58-63)
- ²⁵ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_2.pdf (pages 83-87)
- ²⁶ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Aug. 12, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_2.pdf (pages 95-97)
- ²⁷ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Feb. 18, 2014), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN195/140218_U_ISN195_GOVERNMENT'S_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN195/150911_U_ISN195_FINAL_DETERMINATION.pdf
- ²⁸ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_2.pdf (pages 137-140)
- ²⁹ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Sept. 7, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates201-300.pdf (pages 218-21)
- ³⁰ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Aug. 20, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_2.pdf (pages 187-190)
- ³¹ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Nov. 17, 2014), available at http://www.prs.mil/portals/60/documents/ISN235/20141117_U_ISN235_GOVERNMENT'S_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN235/150318_U_ISN235_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ³² ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_2.pdf (pages 211-214)

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- ³³ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (June 18, 2014), available at http://www.prs.mil/portals/60/documents/ISN242/20140618_U_ISN242_GOVERNMENT'S_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN242/150318_U_ISN242_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ³⁴ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (March 1, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN244/20160301_U_ISN_244_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf
- ³⁵ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (May 21, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates201-300.pdf (pages 244-45)
- ³⁶ ARB 1 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (May 17, 2005), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/ARB_Round_1_Factors_000295-000393.pdf (pages 308-09)
- ³⁷ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Mar. 12, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_2.pdf (pages 225-230)
- ³⁸ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Oct. 17, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates201-300.pdf (pages 258-62)
- ³⁹ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (May 14, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates201-300.pdf (pages 282-84)
- ⁴⁰ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Feb. 29, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_3.pdf (pages 72-77)
- ⁴¹ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Dec. 15, 2014), available at http://www.prs.mil/portals/60/documents/ISN324/141215_U_ISN324_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN324/150417_U_ISN324_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁴² PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Sept. 25, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN434/20150925_U_ISN434_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN434/160112_U_ISN1434_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf

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- ⁴³ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (July 31, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates301-400.pdf (pages 326-28)
- ⁴⁴ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Jul. 24, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN441/20150724_U_ISN441_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN441/20151028_U_ISN441_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁴⁵ ARB 1 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/ARB_Round_1_Factors_000944-001045.pdf (pages 1006-7)
- ⁴⁶ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Jul. 25, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_3.pdf (pages 162-64)
- ⁴⁷ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates301-400.pdf (pages 336-39)
- ⁴⁸ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Apr. 7, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/portals/60/documents/ISN508/150407_U_ISN508_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN508/20160519_U_ISN_508_FINAL_DETERMINATION.pdf
- ⁴⁹ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_3.pdf (pages 185-89)
- ⁵⁰ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Nov. 19, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN522/151119_U_ISN522_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN522/160303_U_ISN522_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf; *Esmail v. Obama*, 639 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2011), available at [https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/CF90BB9790E6DDB68525786C004EBE28/\\$file/10-5282-1302328.pdf](https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/CF90BB9790E6DDB68525786C004EBE28/$file/10-5282-1302328.pdf)
- ⁵¹ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Oct. 22, 2014), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN535/141022_U_ISN535_GOVERNMENT'S_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN535/150212_U_ISN535_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁵² ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Jul. 25, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates301-400.pdf (pages 359-60)

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⁵³ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (Mar. 20, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_3.pdf (pages 205-10)

⁵⁴ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://www.prs.mil/portals/60/documents/ISN552/140611_U_ISN552_Government_Summary_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN552/ISN552SubsequentFReview/20150908_U_ISN552_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf

⁵⁵ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Nov. 19, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates510-650.pdf (pages 581-84)

⁵⁶ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Aug. 20, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_3.pdf (pages 226-227)

⁵⁷ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Jan. 8, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN569/160108_U_ISN569_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN569/160331_U_ISN569_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf

⁵⁸ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Sept. 25, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN576/151115_U_ISN576_COMPENDIUM_PUBLIC_v1.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN576/160112_U_ISN576_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf

⁵⁹ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_4.pdf (pages 54-58)

⁶⁰ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates510-650.pdf (pages 613-18)

⁶¹ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Jan. 13, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN685/20160113_U_ISN_685_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf

⁶² ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_4.pdf (pages 133-137)

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- ⁶³ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Feb. 22, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN694/20160222_U_ISN_694_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁶⁴ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Feb. 18, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN695/20150622_U_ISN695_Governments_UNCLASSIFIED_Public.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN695/150820_U_ISN695_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC_v1.pdf
- ⁶⁵ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Mar. 4, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN696/20160304_U_ISN_696_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁶⁶ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Sept. 13, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_4.pdf (pages 176-179)
- ⁶⁷ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Mar 4, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_4.pdf (pages 192-196)
- ⁶⁸ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of the Evidence (Oct 29, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_4.pdf (pages 228-230)
- ⁶⁹ PRB Detainee Summary (Feb. 3, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN753/20160203_U_ISN_753_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁷⁰ PRB Detainee Summary (Feb. 18, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN760/20160218_U_ISN_760_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁷¹ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Nov. 23, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN762/20151123_U_ISN_762_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN762/160519_U_ISN762_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁷² *United States v. al-Darbi*, Office of Military Commissions, Stipulation of Fact, available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alDarbi2/AI%20Darbi%20II%20\(PE001\)%20Stipulation.pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alDarbi2/AI%20Darbi%20II%20(PE001)%20Stipulation.pdf); *see also* Pre-Trial Agreement, available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alDarbi2/AI%20Darbi%20II%20\(AE010\).pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alDarbi2/AI%20Darbi%20II%20(AE010).pdf)

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- ⁷³ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Dec. 18, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN836/160216_U_ISN836_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN836/160323_U_ISN836_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁷⁴ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Dec. 22, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN837/20151222_U_ISN_837_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN837/160531_U_ISN837_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁷⁵ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Jan. 28, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN838/20160128_U_ISN_838_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁷⁶ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_5.pdf (pages 90 – 92); *see also* *al-Madhawi v. Obama*, 642 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2011), available at [https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/F19B0B6995D635F68525789D004F20D4/\\$file/10-5172-1310289.pdf](https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/F19B0B6995D635F68525789D004F20D4/$file/10-5172-1310289.pdf)
- ⁷⁷ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_5.pdf (pages 101 - 104)
- ⁷⁸ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Dec. 15, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN841/20151215_U_ISN_841_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁷⁹ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Jun. 18, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_5.pdf (pages 125-130)
- ⁸⁰ PRB-Government’s Summary of Evidence (Nov. 23, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN975/20151123_U_ISN_975_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN975/20160602_U_ISN_975_FINAL_DETERMINATION.pdf
- ⁸¹ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Aug 25, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_5.pdf (pages 160-61)
- ⁸² PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Apr. 23, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1045/150423_U_ISN1045_GOVERNMENT’S_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1045/20150928_U_ISN1045_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf

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- ⁸³ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Oct. 27, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1094/151027_U_ISN1094_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1094/160407_U_ISN1094_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁸⁴ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Nov. 12, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1119/20151112_U_ISN1119_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1119/160211_U_ISN1119_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁸⁵ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Jan. 8, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1453/20160108_U_ISN_1453_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1453/20160609_U_ISN_1453_FINAL_DETERMINATION.pdf
- ⁸⁶ ARB 3 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Oct. 31, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates101-200.pdf (pages 150-54)
- ⁸⁷ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Nov. 12, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1457/151112_U_ISN_1457_COMPENDIUM_PUBLIC_V1.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1457/160414_U_ISN1457_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁸⁸ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_5.pdf (pages 226-229)
- ⁸⁹ ARB 4 Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Detainee_Related/11-F-0752_ARB_4_section_5.pdf (pages 239-243)
- ⁹⁰ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Dec. 1, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1463/20151201_U_ISN_1463_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁹¹ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Mar. 1, 2016), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN3148/20160301_U_ISN3148_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf
- ⁹² ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 4); *see also* Military Commission Charges, Referred by Convening Authority (Apr. 4, 2012), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%2011%20\(Referred%20Charges\).pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%2011%20(Referred%20Charges).pdf)

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⁹³ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 10); *see also* Military Commission Charges, Referred by Convening Authority (Apr. 4, 2012), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20\(Referred%20Charges\).pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(Referred%20Charges).pdf)

⁹⁴ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 12); *see also* Military Commission Charges, Referred by Convening Authority (Apr. 4, 2012), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20\(Referred%20Charges\).pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(Referred%20Charges).pdf)

⁹⁵ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 7); *see also* Military Commission Charges, Referred by Convening Authority (Sept. 28, 2011), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alNashiri2/Al%20Nashiri%20II%20\(Referred%20Charges\).pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alNashiri2/Al%20Nashiri%20II%20(Referred%20Charges).pdf)

⁹⁶ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 9)

⁹⁷ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 8)

⁹⁸ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 1); *see also* Military Commission Charges, Referred by Convening Authority (Apr. 4, 2012), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20\(Referred%20Charges\).pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(Referred%20Charges).pdf)

⁹⁹ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 3); *see also* Military Commission Stipulation of Fact, (Feb. 13, 2012), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Khan/Khan%20\(PE001\)%20-%20Stipulation%20of%20Fact.pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Khan/Khan%20(PE001)%20-%20Stipulation%20of%20Fact.pdf) (pages 11-14)

¹⁰⁰ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 6); *see also* Military Commission Stipulation of Fact, (Feb. 13, 2012), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Khan/Khan%20\(PE001\)%20-%20Stipulation%20of%20Fact.pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Khan/Khan%20(PE001)%20-%20Stipulation%20of%20Fact.pdf) (pages 11-14)

¹⁰¹ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 11); *see also* Military Commission Stipulation of Fact, (Feb. 13, 2012), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Khan/Khan%20\(PE001\)%20-%20Stipulation%20of%20Fact.pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Khan/Khan%20(PE001)%20-%20Stipulation%20of%20Fact.pdf) (pages 11-14)

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¹⁰² ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 5); *see also* Military Commission Stipulation of Fact, (Feb. 13, 2012), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Khan/Khan%20\(PE001\)%20-%20Stipulation%20of%20Fact.pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Khan/Khan%20(PE001)%20-%20Stipulation%20of%20Fact.pdf) (pages 11-14)

¹⁰³ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 14)

¹⁰⁴ ODNI Detainee Biographies, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20Press%20Releases/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> (page 13); *see also* Military Commission Charges, Referred by Convening Authority (Apr. 4, 2012), available at [http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20\(Referred%20Charges\).pdf](http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(Referred%20Charges).pdf)

¹⁰⁵ PRB Unclassified Detainee Profile (Dec. 30, 2015), available at http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN10025/20151230_U_ISN_10025_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf; *see also* http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN10025/20160609_U_ISN_10025_FINAL_DETERMINATION.pdf

¹⁰⁶ DOD Release, “Defense Department Takes Custody of High-Value Al Qaeda Operative,” Release No. 494-07 (Apr. 27, 2007), available at <http://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=10792>; *see also* Military Commission Charges, Referred by Convening Authority (June 2, 2014), available at <http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/allIraqi/Hadi%20AI%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf>

¹⁰⁷ DOD Release, “Defense Department Takes Custody Of A High-Value Detainee,” Release No. 206-08 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at <http://archive.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11758>

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